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Abstract. Concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) are an ideal formalism
for modelling probabilistic systems that feature multiple players or com-
ponents with distinct objectives making concurrent, rational decisions.
Examples include communication or security protocols and multi-robot
navigation. Verification methods for CSGs exist but are limited to sce-
narios where agents or players are grouped into two coalitions, with those
in the same coalition sharing an identical objective. In this paper, we pro-
pose multi-coalitional verification techniques for CSGs. We use subgame-
perfect social welfare (or social cost) optimal Nash equilibria, which are
strategies where there is no incentive for any coalition to unilaterally
change its strategy in any game state, and where the total combined
objectives are maximised (or minimised). We present an extension of the
temporal logic rPATL (probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with
rewards) and a corresponding model checking algorithm for a variant of
stopping games to synthesise such equilibria for any number of distinct
coalitions. We implement our techniques in the PRISM-games tool and
apply them to several case studies, including a secret sharing protocol
and a public good game.
1 Introduction
Stochastic multi-player games are a modelling formalism that involves a num-
ber of players making sequences of rational decisions, each of which results in a
probabilistic change in state. Games are well suited to modelling systems that
feature competitive or collaborative behaviour between multiple components or
agents, operating in uncertain or stochastic environments. Examples include
communication or security protocols, which may employ randomisation or send
messages over unreliable channels, and multi-robot or multi-vehicle navigation,
where sensors and actuators are subject to noise or prone to failure. A game-
theoretic approach to modelling also allows rewards, incentives or resource usage
to be incorporated. For example, mechanism design can be used to create proto-
cols reliant on incentive schemes to improve robustness against selfish behaviour
by participants, as utilised in network routing protocols [35] and auctions [14].
Designing reliable systems that comprise multiple components with differing
objectives is a challenge. This is further complicated by the need to consider
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stochastic behaviour. Formal verification techniques for stochastic multi-player
games can be a valuable tool for tackling this problem. The probabilistic model
checker PRISM-games [26] has been developed for modelling and analysis of
stochastic games: both the turn-based variant, where one player makes a de-
cision in each state, and the concurrent variant, where players make decisions
concurrently and without knowledge of each other’s actions. PRISM-games also
supports strategy synthesis, which allows automated generation of strategies for
one or more players in the game, which are guaranteed to satisfy quantitative
correctness specifications written in temporal logic.
The temporal logics used in PRISM-games for stochastic games are based on
rPATL (probabilistic alternating-time temporal logic with rewards) [12], which
combines features of the game logic ATL [4] and probabilistic temporal logics.
For example, in a 3-player game, the formula 〈〈rbt1〉〉P>p[ F g1 ] states “robot 1
has a strategy under which the probability of it successfully reaching its goal
is at least p, regardless of the strategies of robots 2 and 3”. Model checking
and strategy synthesis algorithms for rPATL exist for both turn-based [12] and
concurrent stochastic games [23].
rPATL uses ATL’s coalition operator 〈〈·〉〉 to formulate properties. In the
above example, there are two coalitions, one containing robot 1 and the other
robots 2 and 3. The coalitions have distinctly opposing (zero-sum) objectives,
aiming either to maximise or minimise the probability of robot 1 reaching its
goal. A recent extension [25] allows the two coalitions to have distinct objec-
tives, using Nash equilibria. More precisely, it uses subgame-perfect social wel-
fare optimal Nash equilibria, which are strategies for all players where there
is no incentive for either coalition to unilaterally change its strategy in any
state, and where the total combined objectives are maximised. For example,
〈〈rbt1:rbt2, rbt3〉〉max=?(P[ F g1 ] + P[ F (g2 ∧ g3) ]) asks for such an equilibrium,
where the two coalitions’ objectives are to maximise the probability of reaching
their own (distinct) goals. Model checking rPATL for both the zero-sum [23]
and equilibria-based [25] properties has the advantage that it essentially reduces
to the analysis of 2-player stochastic games, for which various algorithms exist
(e.g., [2,3,10]). However, a clear limitation of [23] and [25] is the assumption that
agents can, or would be willing to, collaborate and form two distinct coalitions.
In this paper, we propose multi-coalitional verification techniques for CSGs.
We extend the temporal logic rPATL to allow reasoning about any number of
distinct coalitions with distinct quantitative objectives, expressed using a variety
of temporal operators capturing either the probability of an event occurring or a
reward measure. We then give a model checking algorithm for the logic against
concurrent stochastic games (CSGs), which employs a combination of backward
induction (for finite-horizon operators) and value iteration (for infinite-horizon
operators). The algorithm is restricting to a variant of stopping games [13] where
with probability 1 eventually the outcome of each player does not change by con-
tinuing. A key ingredient of the computation is finding optimal Nash equilibria
for n-player games, which we perform using support enumeration [34] and a mix-
ture of SMT and non-linear optimisation solvers. We implement our techniques
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in the PRISM-games tool and apply them to several case studies, including a
secret sharing protocol and a public good game. Unlike [25], we are now able to
verify scenarios with more than two players.
Related work. As summarised above, there are various algorithms to solve
CSGs, e.g., [2,3,10], and model checking techniques have been developed for
both zero-sum [23] and equilibria-based [25] versions of rPATL on CSGs, imple-
mented in PRISM-games [26]. However, all of this work assumes or reduces to the
2-player case. Equilibria for n-player CSGs are considered in [8], but only com-
plexity results, not algorithms, are presented. Other tools exist to reason about
equilibria, including PRALINE [7], EAGLE [38], EVE [19], MCMAS-SLK [9]
(via strategy logic) and Gambit [27], but these are all for non-stochastic games.
2 Preliminaries
We let Dist(X) denote the set of probability distributions over set X . For any
vector v we use v(i) to denote the ith entry of the vector.
Definition 1 (Normal form game). A (finite, n-person) normal form game
(NFG) is a tuple N = (N,A, u) where: N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players;
A = A1× · · · ×An and Ai is a finite set of actions available to player i ∈ N ;
u=(u1, . . . , un) and ui : A→ R is a utility function for player i ∈ N .
For an NFG N, the players choose actions at the same time, where the choice for
player i ∈ N is over the action set Ai. When each player i chooses ai, the utility
received by player j equals uj(a1, . . . , an). A (mixed) strategy σi for player i is
a distribution over its action set. Let ηai denote the pure strategy that selects
action ai with probability 1 and Σ
i
N
the set of strategies for player i. A strategy
profile σ=(σ1, . . . , σn) is a tuple of strategies for each player and under σ the
expected utility of player i equals:
ui(σ)
def
=
∑
(a1,...,an)∈A
ui(a1, . . . , an) ·
(∏n
j=1 σj(aj)
)
.
For strategy σi of a player, the support of σi is the set of actions it chooses with
nonzero probability, i.e., {ai ∈ Ai | σi(ai)>0}. Furthermore, the support of a
profile is the product of the supports of the individual strategies and a profile is
said to have full support if it includes all available action tuples.
We now fix an NFG N=(N,A, u) and introduce the notion of Nash equi-
librium and the variants we require. For profile σ=(σ1, . . . , σn) and player i
strategy σ′i, we define the sequence σ−i = (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σi+1, . . . , σn) and profile
σ−i[σ
′
i] = (σ1, . . . , σi−1, σ
′
i, σi+1, . . . , σn).
Definition 2 (Best and least response). For player i and strategy sequence
σ−i, a best response for player i to σ−i is a strategy σ
⋆
i for player i such that
ui(σ−i[σ
⋆
i ]) > ui(σ−i[σi]) for all σi ∈ Σ
i
N
and a least response for player i to σ−i
is a strategy σ⋆i for player i such that ui(σ−i[σ
⋆
i ]) 6 ui(σ−i[σi]) for all σi ∈ Σ
i
N
.
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Definition 3 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile σ⋆ is a Nash equilibrium
(NE) if σ⋆i is a best response to σ
⋆
−i for all i ∈ N .
Definition 4 (Social welfare NE). A NE σ⋆ is a social welfare optimal NE
(SWNE) if u1(σ
⋆)+ · · ·+un(σ
⋆) > u1(σ)+ · · ·+un(σ) for all NE σ of N.
Definition 5 (Social cost NE). A profile σ⋆ of N is a social cost optimal
NE (SCNE) if it is a NE of N− = (N,A,−u) and u1(σ
⋆)+ · · ·+un(σ
⋆) 6
u1(σ)+ · · ·+un(σ) for all NE σ of N
−. Furthermore, σ⋆ is a SWNE of N− if
and only if σ⋆ is a SCNE of N.
The notion of SWNE is standard [30] and applies when utility values represent
profits or rewards. We use the dual notion of SCNE for utilities that represent
losses or costs. Example objectives in this category include minimising the prob-
ability of a fault or the expected time to complete a task. We have chosen to
represent SCNE directly since this is more natural than the alternative of simply
negating utilities, particularly in the case of probabilities.
Example 1. Consider the NFG representing a variant of a public good game [21],
in which three players each receive a fixed amount of capital (10e) and can choose
to invest none, half or all of it in a common stock (represented by the actions
in0i , in
5
i and in
10
i respectively). The total invested by the players is multiplied by
a factor f and distributed equally among the players, and the aim of the players
is to maximise their profit. The utility function of player i is therefore given by:
ui(in
k1
1 , in
k2
2 , in
k3
3 ) = (f/3)·(k1+k2+k3)− ki .
for ki ∈ {0, 5, 10} and 16i63. If f=2, then the profile where each investor chooses
not to invest is a NE and each player’s utility equals 0. More precisely, if a single
player was to deviate from this profile by investing half or all of their capital,
then their utility would decrease to (2/3)·5−5 = −5/3 and (2/3)·10−10 = −10/3
respectively. Since this is the only NE it is also the only SWNE. For example, the
profile where each player invests all of their capital is not an NE as, under this
profile, a player’s utility equals (2/3)·30−10 = 10 and any player can increase
their utility to (2/3)·25−5 = 35/3 by deviating and investing half of their capital.
On the other hand, if f=3, then there are two NE: when the players do
not invest and the players invest all of their capital. The sum of utilities of the
player under these profiles are 0+0+0 = 0 and 20+20+20 = 60 respectively, and
therefore the second profile is the only SWNE.
Definition 6 (Concurrent stochastic game). A concurrent stochastic multi-
player game (CSG) is a tuple G = (N,S, S¯, A,∆, δ,AP ,L) where:
– N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of players;
– S is a finite set of states and S¯ ⊆ S is a set of initial states;
– A = (A1∪{⊥})× · · ·×(An∪{⊥}) where Ai is a finite set of actions available
to player i ∈ N and ⊥ is an idle action disjoint from the set ∪ni=1Ai;
– ∆ : S → 2∪
n
i=1Ai is an action assignment function;
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– δ : S×A→ Dist(S) is a (partial) probabilistic transition function;
– AP is a set of atomic propositions and L : S → 2AP is a labelling function.
A CSG G starts in an initial state s¯ ∈ S¯ and, when in state s, each player
i ∈ N selects an action from its available actions Ai(s)
def
= ∆(s) ∩ Ai if this
set is non-empty, and from {⊥} otherwise. For any state s and action tuple
a = (a1, . . . , an), the partial probabilistic transition function δ is defined for
(s, a) if and only if ai ∈ Ai(s) for all i ∈ N . We augment CSGs with reward
structures, which are tuples of the form r=(rA, rS) where rA : S×A → R and
rS : S → R are action and state reward functions, respectively.
A path is a sequence pi = s0
α0−→ s1
α1−→ · · · such that si ∈ S, αi =
(ai1, . . . , a
i
n) ∈ A, a
i
j ∈ Aj(si) for j ∈ N and δ(si, αi)(si+1)>0 for all i>0. Given
a path pi, we denote by pi(i) the (i+1)th state, pi[i] the (i+1)th action, and if pi
is finite, last(pi) the final state. The sets of finite and infinite paths (starting in
state s) of G are given by FPathsG and IPathsG (FPathsG,s and IPathsG,s).
Strategies are used to resolve the choices of the players. Formally, a strategy
for player i is a function σi : FPathsG → Dist(Ai∪{⊥}) such that, if σi(pi)(ai)>0,
then ai ∈ Ai(last(pi)). A strategy profile is a tuple σ=(σ1, . . . , σn) of strategies
for all players. The set of strategies for player i and set of profiles are denoted
Σi
G
and ΣG. Given a profile σ and state s, let IPaths
σ
G,s denote the infinite paths
with initial state s corresponding to σ. We can then define, using standard
techniques [22], a probability measure Probσ
G,s over IPaths
σ
G,s and, for a random
variable X : IPathsG → R, the expected value E
σ
G,s(X) of X in s under σ.
In a CSG, a player’s utility or objective is represented by a random variable
Xi : IPathsG → R>0. Such variables can encode, for example, the probability of
reaching a target or the expected cumulative reward before reaching a target.
Given an objective for each player, social welfare and social cost NE can be
defined as for NFGs. As in [25], we consider subgame perfect NE [33], which are
NE in every state of the CSG. In addition, for infinite-horizon objectives, the
existence of NE is an open problem [6] so, for such objectives, we use ε-NE,
which exist for any ε>0. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 7 (Subgame perfect ε-NE). For CSG G and ε>0, a profile σ⋆
is a subgame perfect ε-NE for the objectives 〈Xi〉i∈N if and only if E
σ⋆
G,s(Xi) >
supσi∈Σi E
σ⋆
−i[σi]
G,s (Xi)− ε for all i ∈ N and s ∈ S.
Example 2. We now extend Example 1 to allow the players to invest their capital
(and subsequent profits) over a number of months and assume that at the end
of each month the parameter f can either increase or decrease by 0.2 with
probability 0.1. This can be modelled as a CSG G whose states are tuples of
the form (m, f, c1, c2, c3), where m is the current month, f the parameter value
and ci is the current capital of player i (the initial capital plus or minus any
profits or losses made in previous months). If f has initial value 2 and the players
start with a capital of 10e, then the initial state of G equals (0, 2, 10, 10, 10). The
actions of player i are of the form inkii , which corresponds to i investing ki in the
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current month. The probabilistic transition function of the game is such that:
δ((m, f, c1, c2, c3), (in
k1
1 , in
k2
2 , in
k3
3 ))(m
′, f ′, c′1, c
′
2, c
′
3)
=


0.8 if m′=m+1, f ′=f and c′i=ci+pi
0.1 if m′=m+1, f ′=f+0.2 and c′i=ci+pi
0.1 if m′=m+1, f ′=f−0.2 and c′i=ci+pi
0 otherwise
where pi = (f/3)·(k1+k2+k3)− ki for ki ∈ {0, 5, 10} and 16i63.
If we are interested in the profits of the players after k months, then we would
consider a random variable for player i which would return for a path with kth
state (k, f, c1, c2, c3) the value ci−10.
3 Extended rPATL with Nash Formulae
We now consider the logic rPATL with Nash formulae [25] and enhance it with
equilibria-based properties that separate players into more than two coalitions.
Since we are limited to considering ε-SWNE and ε-SCNE for infinite-horizon
properties, we assume some ε has been fixed in advance.
Definition 8 (Extended rPATL syntax). The syntax of our extended ver-
sion of rPATL is given by the grammar:
φ := true | a | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | 〈〈C〉〉P∼q [ψ ] | 〈〈C〉〉R
r
∼x[ ρ ] | 〈〈C1: · · · :Cm〉〉opt∼x(θ)
θ := P[ψ ]+· · ·+P[ψ ] | Rr[ ρ ]+· · ·+Rr[ ρ ]
ψ := Xφ | φ U6k φ | φ U φ
ρ := I=k | C6k | F φ
where a is an atomic proposition, C and C1, . . . , Cm are coalitions of players such
that Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ for all 1 6 i 6= j 6 m and ∪
m
i=1Ci = N , opt ∈ {min,max},
∼∈ {<,6,>, >}, q ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ R, r is a reward structure and k ∈ N.
Our addition to the logic is Nash formulae of the form 〈〈C1:· · ·:Cm〉〉opt∼x(θ),
where the nonzero sum formulae θ comprises a sum of m probability or re-
ward objectives (for full details of the rest of the logic see [23,25]). The for-
mula 〈〈C1:· · ·:Cm〉〉max∼x(P[ψ1 ]+· · ·+P[ψm ]) holds in state s if, when the play-
ers form the coalitions C1, . . . , Cm, the sum of the values of the objectives
P[ψ1 ], . . . , P[ψm ] in state s for the coalitions C1, . . . , Cm is ∼x for all subgame
perfect SWNE profiles. The case for reward objectives is similar and, for for-
mulae of the form 〈〈C1:· · ·:Cm〉〉min∼x(θ), the quantification is over SCNE rather
than SWNE. We also allow numerical queries of the form 〈〈C1:· · ·:Cm〉〉opt=?(θ),
which return the sum of SWNE or SCNE values.
In a probabilistic objective θ=P[ψ1 ]+· · ·+P[ψm ], ψi can be a next (Xφ),
bounded until (φ1 U
6k φ2) or until (φ1 U φ2) formula, with the usual equiv-
alences, e.g. F φ ≡ true U φ. For reward objective θ=Rr1 [ ρ1 ]+· · ·+R
rm [ ρm ],
each ρi refers to a reward formula with respect to reward structure ri and can
be bounded instantaneous reward (I=k), bounded accumulated reward (C6k) or
reachability reward (F φ).
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Example 3. Recall the public good CSG from Example 2. Examples of nonzero-
sum formulae include:
– 〈〈p1:p2:p3〉〉max>3(P[ F c1>20 ]+P[ F c2>20 ]+P[ F c3>20 ]) states that the play-
ers can collaborate such that they each eventually double their capital with
probability 1;
– 〈〈p1:p2:p3〉〉max=?(R
cap1 [ I=4 ]+Rcap2 [ I=4 ]+Rcap3 [ I=4 ]) asks what is the sum
of the expected capitals of the players at 4 months when they collaborate,
where the state reward function of capi returns the capital of player i.
– 〈〈p1:p2:p3〉〉max>50(R
pro
1 [ C66 ]+Rpro2 [ C66 ]+Rpro3 [ C66 ]) states that the cu-
mulative expected profit of the players after 6 months when they collaborate
is at least 50, where the action reward function of proi returns the expected
profit of player i from a state for the given action tuple.
To give the semantics of nonzero-sum state formulae, we require an extension
of coalition games from [23] which, given a CSG G and partition C of the players
into m coalitions, reduces G to an m-player coalition game, where each player
corresponds to one of the coalitions in C. Without loss of generality, we assume C
is of the form {{1, . . . , n1}, {n1+1, . . . n2}, . . . , {nm−1+1, . . . nm}}. Furthermore,
let j′ denote player j’s position in its coalition.
Definition 9 (Coalition game). For CSG G=(N,S, s¯, A,∆, δ,AP ,L) and par-
tition of the players into m coalitions C = {C1, . . . , Cm}, we define the coalition
game GC=(M,S, s¯, AC , ∆C , δC ,AP ,L) as an m-player game where:
– M = {1, . . . ,m};
– AC = (AC1 ∪ {⊥})× . . .×(A
C
m ∪ {⊥});
– ACi = (
∏
j∈Ci
(Aj ∪ {⊥}) \ {(⊥, . . . ,⊥)}
)
for all i ∈M ;
– for any s ∈ S and i ∈ M : aCi ∈ ∆
C(s) if and only if either ∆(s) ∩ Aj = ∅
and aCi (j
′) = ⊥ or aCi (j
′) ∈ ∆(s) for all j ∈ Ci;
– for any s ∈ S and (aC1 , . . . , a
C
m) ∈ A
C : δC(s, (aC1 , . . . , a
C
m)) = δ(s, (a1, . . . , an))
where for i ∈M and j ∈ Ci if a
C
i =⊥, then aj=⊥ and otherwise aj=a
C
i (j
′).
Furthermore, for a reward structure r = (rA, rS), by abuse of notation we use
r = (rCA, r
C
S) for the corresponding reward structure of G
C where:
– for any s ∈ S, aCi ∈ A
C
i : r
C
AC
(s, (aC1 , . . . , a
C
m)) = rA(s, (a1, . . . , an)) where
for i ∈M and j ∈ Ci, if a
C
i = ⊥, then aj=⊥ and otherwise aj=a
C
i (j
′);
– for any s ∈ S : rCS(s)=rS(s).
Definition 10 (Extended rPATL semantics). The satisfaction relation |=
of our rPATL extension is defined inductively on the structure of the formula.
The propositional logic fragment (true, a, ¬, ∧) is defined in the usual way. The
zero-sum formulae 〈〈C〉〉P∼q [ψ ] and 〈〈C〉〉R
r
∼x[ ρ ] are defined as in [23,25]. For a
Nash formula and state s ∈ S in CSG G, we have:
s |= 〈〈C1: · · · :Cm〉〉opt∼x(θ)⇔ ∃σ
⋆ ∈ ΣGC .
(
E
σ⋆
GC ,s(X
θ
1 ) + · · ·+ E
σ⋆
GC ,s(X
θ
m)
)
∼ x
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and σ⋆ = (σ⋆1 , . . . , σ
⋆
m) is a subgame perfect SWNE if opt=max and a subgame
perfect SCNE if opt=min4 for the objectives (Xθ1 , . . . , X
θ
m) in G
C where C =
{C1, . . . , Cm} and for 16i6m and pi ∈ IPaths
σ⋆
GC,s :
X
P[ψ1 ]+···+P[ψm ]
i (pi) = 1 if pi |=ψ
i and 0 otherwise
X
R
r1 [ ρ1 ]+···+Rrm [ ρm ]
i (pi) = rew(ri, ρ
i)(pi)
pi |= Xφ ⇔ pi(1) |=φ
pi |=φ1 U
6k φ2 ⇔ ∃i 6 k. (pi(i) |=φ2 ∧ ∀j < i. pi(j) |=φ1)
pi |=φ1 U φ2 ⇔ ∃i ∈ N. (pi(i) |=φ2 ∧ ∀j < i. pi(j) |=φ1)
rew(r, I=k)(pi) = rS(pi(k))
rew(r, C6k)(pi) =
∑k−1
i=0
(
rA(pi(i), pi[i]) + rS(pi(i))
)
rew(r, F φ)(pi) =
{
∞ if ∀j ∈ N. pi(j) 6|=φ∑kφ
i=0
(
rA(pi(i), pi[i]) + rS(pi(i))
)
otherwise
and kφ = min{k−1 | pi(k) |=φ}.
4 Model Checking CSGs against Nash Formulae
The logic rPATL is branching-time and the model checking algorithm works
by recursively computing the set Sat(φ) of states satisfying formula φ over the
structure of φ. Therefore, to extend the existing algorithm of [23,25], we need
only consider formulae of the form 〈〈C1:· · ·:Cm〉〉opt∼x(θ). From Definition 10,
this requires the computation of subgame perfect SWNE or SCNE values of the
objectives (Xθ1 , . . . , X
θ
m) and a comparison of their sum to the threshold x.
We first explain how we compute SWNE values in NFGs. Next we consider
CSGs, and show how to compute subgame perfect SWNE and SCNE values for
finite-horizon objectives and approximate values for infinite-horizon objectives.
For the remainder of this section we fix an NFG N and CSG G.
As in [25], to check nonzero-sum properties on CSGs, we have to work with a
restricted class of games. This can be seen as a variant of stopping games [13], as
used for multi-objective turn-based stochastic games. Compared to [13], we use
a weaker, property-dependent assumption, which ensures that, under all profiles,
with probability 1, eventually the outcome of each player’s property does not
change by continuing. This can be checked using graph algorithms [1].
Assumption 1. For each subformula P[φi1 U φ
i
2 ], set Sat(¬φ
i
1 ∨ φ
i
2) is reached
with probability 1 from all states under all profiles. For each subformula Rr[ F φi ],
the set Sat(φi) is reached with probability 1 from all states under all profiles.
Computing SWNE Values of NFGs. Computing NE values for an n-player
game is a complex task when n>2, as it can no longer be reduced to a linear
4 For infinite-horizon properties, this is a subgame perfect ε-SWNE or ε-SCNE.
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programming problem. The algorithm for the two-player case presented in [25],
based on labelled polytopes, starts by considering all the regions of the strategy
profile space and then iteratively reduces the search space as positive probabil-
ity assignments are found and added as restrictions on this space. The efficiency
of this approach deteriorates when analysing games with large numbers of ac-
tions and when one or more players are indifferent, as the possible assignments
resulting from action permutations need to be exhausted.
Going in the opposite direction, support enumeration [34] is a method for
computing NE that exhaustively examines all sub-regions, i.e., supports, of the
strategy profile space, one at a time, checking whether that sub-region contains
equilibria. The number of supports is exponential in the number of actions and
equals
∏n
i=1(2
|Ai| − 1). Therefore computing SWNE values through support
enumeration will only be efficient for games with a small number of actions.
We now show how, for a given support, using the following lemma the com-
putation of SWNE profiles can be encoded as a nonlinear programming problem.
Lemma 1 ([34]). The strategy profile σ=(σ1, . . . , σn) of N is an NE if and only
if the following conditions are satisfied:
∀i ∈ N. ∀ai ∈ Ai. σi(ai) > 0→ ui(σ−i[ηai ]) = ui(σ) (1)
∀i ∈ N. ∀ai ∈ Ai. σi(ai) = 0→ ui(σ−i[ηai ]) 6 ui(σ) . (2)
Given the support B = B1× · · · ×Bn ⊆ A, to construct the problem, we first
choose pivot actions5 bpi ∈ Bi for i ∈ N , then the problem is to minimise:
(∑
i∈N maxa∈A ui(a)
)
−
∑
i∈N
(∑
b∈B ui(b) ·
(∏
j∈N pj,bj
))
(3)
subject to:
∑
c∈B−i(b
p
i
) ui(c) ·
(∏
j∈N−i
pj,cj
)
−
∑
c∈B−i(bi)
ui(c) ·
(∏
j∈N−i
pj,cj
)
= 0 (4)
∑
c∈B−i(b
p
i
) ui(c) ·
(∏
j∈N−i
pj,cj
)
−
∑
c∈B−i(ai)
ui(c) ·
(∏
j∈N−i
pj,cj
)
> 0 (5)∑
bi∈Bi
pi,bi = 1 and pi,bi > 0 (6)
for all i ∈ N , bi ∈ Bi\{b
p
i } and ai ∈ Ai\Bi where B−i(ci) = B1× · · · ×Bi−1×{ci}
×Bi+1× · · ·×Bn and N−i = N\{i}. The variables in the above program repre-
sent the probabilities players choose different actions, i.e. pi,bi is the probability
i selects bi. The constraints (6) ensure the probabilities of each player sum to
one and the support of the corresponding profile equals B. The constraints (4)
and (5) require that the solution corresponds to a NE as these encode the con-
straints (1) and (2), respectively, of Lemma 1 when restricting to pivot actions.
This restriction is sufficient as (1) requires all actions in the support to yield the
same utility. The first term in (3) corresponds to the maximum possible sum of
utilities for the players, i.e. it sums the maximum utility of each player, and the
5 For each i ∈ N this can be any action in Bi.
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a u1 u2 u3
(c1, c2, c3) 7 7 7
(c1, c2, d3) 3 3 9
a u1 u2 u3
(c1, d2, c3) 3 9 3
(c1, d2, d3) 0 5 5
a u1 u2 u3
(d1, c2, c3) 9 3 3
(d1, c2, d3) 5 0 5
a u1 u2 u3
(d1, d2, c3) 5 5 0
(d1, d2, d3) 1 1 1
Table 1: Utilities for an instance of a three-player prisoner’s dilemma.
second sums the individual utilities of the players when they play according to
the profile corresponding to the solution. By minimising the difference between
these two terms, we require the solution to be social welfare optimal.
SMT solvers with nonlinear modules can be used to solve such problems, al-
though they can be inefficient. Alternative approaches include barrier or interior-
point methods [31].
Example 4. Consider the instance of three prisoner’s dilemma with utilities de-
scribed in Table 1 where Ai={ci, di} for 16i63. For the full support B
fs the
utility of player i equals:
ui(B
fs ) = pi,ci ·ui(B
fs
−i(ci)) + pi,di ·ui(B
fs
−i(di))
where ui(B
fs
−i(ci)) and ui(B
fs
−i(di)) are the utilities of player i when switching to
choosing action ci and di with probability 1 and are given by:
ui(B
fs
−i(ci)) = 7·pj,cj ·pk,ck + 3·pj,cj ·pk,dk + 3·pj,dj ·pk,ck
ui(B
fs
−i(di)) = 9·pj,cj ·pk,ck + 5·pj,cj ·pk,dk + 5·pj,dj ·pk,ck + pj,dj ·pk,dk
for 16i 6=j 6=k63. Now, choosing ci as the pivot action for 16i63, we obtain the
nonlinear program of minimising:
27− (u1(B
fs ) + u2(B
fs) + u3(B
fs ))
subject to: ui(B
fs
−i(ci))−ui(B
fs
−1(di)) = 0, pi,ci+pi,di = 1, pi,ci>0 and pi,di>0 for
16i63. When trying to solving this problem, we find that there is no NE as the
constraints reduce to p3,c3 ·(p2,d2 + 1) = −1, which cannot be satisfied.
For the partial support Bps={(d1, d2, d3)}, di is the only choice of pivot
action for player i and, after a reduction, we obtain the program of minimising:
27− (p2,d2p3,d3 + p1,d1p3,d3 + p1,d1p2,d2)
subject to: pi,di ·pj,dj > 0, pi,di=1 and pi,di>0 for 16i 6=j63. Solving this problem
we see it is satisfied, and therefore the profile where each player i chooses di is a
NE. This demonstrates that, as for the two-player prisoner’s dilemma, defection
dominates cooperation for all players, which leads to the only NE.
Computing Values of Nash Formulae. We now show how to compute the
SWNE values of a Nash formula 〈〈C:· · ·Cm〉〉opt∼x(θ). The case for SCNE values
can be computed similarly, where to compute SCNE values of a NFG N, we use
Definition 5, negate the utilities of N, find SWNE values of the resulting NFG
and return the negation of these values as SCNE values of N.
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If all the objectives in the nonzero sum formula θ are finite-horizon, backward
induction [36,29] can be applied to compute (precise) subgame perfect SWNE
values. On the other hand, when all the objectives are infinite-horizon, we ex-
tend the techniques of [25] for two player games and use value iteration [11]
to approximate subgame perfect SWNE values. The extension is non-trivial, as
in the two-player case, when one player reaches their goal, we can apply MDP
verification techniques by making the players form a coalition to reach the re-
maining goal. However, in the n-player case, if one player reaches their goal we
cannot reduce the analysis to a (n−1)-player game, as the choices of the player
that has reached its goal can still influence the outcomes of the remaining play-
ers, and making the player form a coalition with one of the other players will
give the other player an advantage. Instead, we need to keep track of the set of
players that have reached their goal (denoted D) and can no longer reach their
goal in the case of until formulae (denoted E), and define the values at each
iteration using these sets. In cases when there is a combination of finite- and
infinite-horizon objectives, we can extend the techniques of [25] and make all
objectives infinite-horizon by modifying the game in a standard manner.
We use the notation VGC(s, θ) (VGC (s, θ, n)) for the vector of computed values
of the objectives (Xθ1 , X
θ
2 , . . . , X
θ
m) in state s of G
C (at iteration n). We also
use 1m and 0m to denote a vector of size m whose entries all equal to 1 or 0,
respectively. For any set of states S′ and state s we let ηS′(s) equal 1 if s ∈ S
′ and
0 otherwise. Furthermore, to simplify the presentation the step bounds appearing
in path and reward formulae can take negative values.
Bounded Probabilistic Until. If θ = P[φ11 U
k1 φ12 ]+ · · ·+P[φ
m
1 U
6km φ6m2 ], we
compute SWNE values of the objectives for the nonzero-sum formulae θn =
P[φ11 U
6k1−n φ12 ]+ · · ·+P[φ
m
1 U
6km−n φm2 ] for 06n6k recursively, where k =
max{k1, . . . , kl} and VGC(s, θ) = VGC(s,∅,∅, θ0). For any state s and 06n6k,
D,E ⊆M such that D ∩E = ∅:
VGC(s,D,E, θn) =


(ηD(1), . . . , ηD(m)) if D ∪E =M
VGC (s,D ∪D
′, E, θn) else if D
′ 6= ∅
VGC(s,D,E ∪E
′, θn) else if E
′ 6= ∅
val (N) otherwise
where D′ = {l ∈ M\(D ∪ E) | s ∈ Sat(φl2)}, E
′ = {l ∈ M\(D ∪ E) | s ∈
Sat(¬φl1 ∧ ¬φ
l
2)} and val(N) equals SWNE values of the game N = (M,A
C , u)
in which for any 16l6m and a ∈ AC :
ul(a) =


1 if l ∈ D
0 else if l ∈ E
0 else if nl−n 6 0∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, a)(s′) · vs
′,l
n−1 otherwise
and (vs
′,1
n−1, v
s′,2
n−1, . . . , v
s′,m
n−1 ) = VGC(s
′, D,E, θn−1) for all s
′ ∈ S.
Instantaneous Rewards. If θ = Rr1 [ I=k1 ]+ · · ·+Rrm [ I=km ], we compute SWNE
values of the objectives for the nonzero-sum formulae θn = R
r1 [ I=n1−n ] + · · ·+
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rm [ I=nl−n ] for 06n6k recursively, where k=max{k1, . . . , kl} and VGC(s, θ) =
VGC(s, θ0). For any state s and 06n6k, VGC(s, θn) equals SWNE values of the
game N = (M,AC , u) in which for any 16l6m and a ∈ AC :
ul(a) =


0 if nl−n < 0∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, a)(s′) · rlS(s
′) else if nl−n = 0∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, a)(s′) · vs
′,l
n+1 otherwise
and (vs
′,1
n+1, . . . , v
s′,m
n+1 ) = VGC(s
′, θn+1) for all s
′ ∈ S.
Bounded Cumulative Rewards. If θ = Rr1 [ C6k1 ] + · · ·+ Rrm [ C6km ], we compute
SWNE values of the objectives for the nonzero-sum formulae θn = R
r1 [ C6n1−n ]+
· · ·+Rrl [ C6nm−n ] for 06n6k recursively, where k=max{k1, . . . , kl} and VGC(s, θ)
= VGC(s, θ0). For any state s and 06n6k, VGC (s, θn) equals SWNE values of the
game N = (M,AC , u) in which for any 16l6m and a ∈ AC :
ul(a) =
{
0 if nl−n 6 0
rlS(s) + r
l
A(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, a)(s′) · vs
′,l
n+1 otherwise
and (vs
′,1
n+1, . . . , v
s′,m
n+1 ) = VGC(s
′, θn+1) for all s
′ ∈ S.
Probabilistic Until. If θ = P[φ11 U φ
1
2 ]+ · · ·+P[φ
m
1 U φ
m
2 ], values can be com-
puted through value iteration as the limit VGC(s, θ) = limn→∞ VGC(s, θ, n) where
VGC(s, θ, n) = VGC(s,∅,∅, θ, n) and for any D,E ⊆M such that D ∩ E = ∅:
VGC(s,D,E, θ, n) =


(ηD(1), . . . , ηD(m)) if D ∪ E =M
(ηSat(φ1
2
)(s), . . . , ηSat(φm2 )(s)) else if n = 0
VGC (s,D ∪D
′, E, θ, n) else if D′ 6= ∅
VGC(s,D,E ∪E
′, θ, n) else if E′ 6= ∅
val(N) otherwise
where D′ = {l ∈ M\(D ∪ E) | s ∈ Sat(φl2)}, E
′ = {l ∈ M\(D ∪ E) | s ∈
Sat(¬φl1 ∧ ¬φ
l
2)} and val(N) equals SWNE values of the game N = (M,A
C , u)
in which for any 16l6m and a ∈ AC :
ul(a) =


1 if l ∈ D
0 else if l ∈ E∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, a)(s′) · vs
′,l
n−1 otherwise
and (vs
′,1
n−1, v
s′,2
n−1, . . . , v
s′,m
n−1 ) = VGC(s
′, D,E, θ, n−1) for all s′ ∈ S.
Expected Reachability. If θ = Rr1 [ F φ1 ]+ · · ·+Rrm [ F φm ], values can be com-
puted through value iteration as the limit VGC(s, θ) = limn→∞ VGC(s, θ, n) where
VGC(s, θ, n) = VGC(s,∅, θ, n) and for any D ⊆M :
VGC(s,D, θ, n) =


0m if D =M
0m else if n = 0
VGC(s,D ∪D
′, θ, n) else if D′ 6= ∅
val(N) otherwise
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D′ = {l ∈ M\D | s ∈ Sat(φl)} and val(N) equals SWNE values of the game
N = (M,AC , u) in which for any 16l6m and a ∈ AC :
ul(a) =
{
0 if l ∈ D
rlS(s) + r
l
A(s, a) +
∑
s′∈S δ
C(s, a)(s′) · vs
′,l
n−1 otherwise
and (vs
′,1
n−1, v
s′,2
n−1, . . . , v
s′,m
n−1 ) = VGC(s
′, D, θ, n−1) for all s′ ∈ S.
Strategy Synthesis.When performing property verification, it is usually bene-
ficial to include strategy synthesis, that is, construct a witness to the satisfaction
of a property. When verifying a Nash formula 〈〈C1:C2: · · · :Cm〉〉opt∼x(θ), we can
also return a subgame perfect SWNE or SCNE for the objectives (Xθ1 , . . . , X
θ
N ).
This is achieved by keeping track of a SWNE for the NFG solved in each state.
The synthesised strategies require randomisation and memory. Randomisation
is needed for NE of NFGs. Memory is required for finite-horizon properties and
since choices change after a path formula becomes true or a target is reached.
For infinite-horizon properties only approximate ε-NE profiles are synthesised.
Correctness and Complexity. The proof of correctness of the algorithm is
given in Appendix A. In the case of finite-horizon nonzero-sum formulae the
correctness of the model checking algorithm follows from the fact that we use
backward induction [36,29]. For unbounded nonzero-sum formulae the proof is
based on showing that the infinite-horizon computed during value iteration cor-
respond to subgame perfect SWNE or SCNE values of finite game trees, and the
values of these game trees converge uniformly to the actual values of GC , respec-
tively. The complexity of the algorithm is linear in the formula size, and finding
subgame perfect NE for reachability objectives in n-player games is PSPACE [8].
Value iteration requires finding all NE for a NFG in each state of the model, and
computing NE of an NFG with three (or more) players is PPAD-complete [15].
5 Case Studies and Experimental Results
We have implemented our approach on top of PRISM-games 3.0 [26], extending
the implementation to support multi-coalitional equilibria-based properties. The
files of the case results in this section are available from [42].
Implementation. CSGs are specified using the PRISM-games 3.0 modelling
language, as described in [25]. Models are built and stored using the tool’s Java-
based ‘explicit’ engine, which employs sparse matrices. Finding SWNE of NFGs,
which can be reduced to solving a nonlinear programming problem (see Sec-
tion 4), is performed using a combination of the SMT solver Z3 [16] and the
nonlinear optimisation suite Ipopt [40]. Although SMT solvers are able to find
solutions to nonlinear problems, they are not guaranteed to do so and are only
efficient in certain cases. These cases include when there is a small number of
actions per player or finding support assignments for which an equilibrium is not
possible. To mitigate the inefficiencies of the SMT solver, we use Z3 for filter-
ing out unsatisfiable support assignments with a timeout, and therefore given a
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Game Players Actions Supports
Supports returned by Z3 Time(s)
unsat sat unknown Ipopt
Majority Voting
3 3,3,3 343 330 12 1 0.309
3 4,4,4 3,375 3,236 110 29 18.89
3 5,5,5 29,791 26,250 155 3,386 336.5
4 2,2,2,2 81 59 22 0 0.184
4 3,3,3,3 2,401 2,212 87 102 6.847
4 4,4,4,4 50,625 41,146 518 8,961 1,158
5 2,2,2,2,2 243 181 62 0 0.591
5 3,3,3,3,3 16,807 14,950 266 1,591 253.3
Covariant game
3 3,3,3 343 304 6 33 7.645
3 4,4,4 3,375 2,488 16 871 203.8
3 5,5,5 29,791 14,271 8 15,512 5,801
4 2,2,2,2 81 76 3 2 0.106
4 3,3,3,3 2,401 1,831 0 570 183.0
5 2,2,2,2,2 243 221 8 14 4.128
5 3,3,3,3,3 16,807 6,600 7 10,200 5,002
Table 2: Finding SWNE in NFGs (timeout of 20ms for Z3).
support assignment Z3 returns either unsat, sat or unknown (if the timeout is
reached). If either sat or unknown are returned, then the assignment is passed to
Ipopt, which checks for satisfiability (if required) and computes SWNE values
using an interior-point filter line-search algorithm [41]. To speed up the overall
computation the support assignments are analysed in parallel. We also search
for and filter out dominated strategies as a precomputation step. The NFGs are
built on the fly, as well as the gradient of the objective function (3) and the
Jacobian of the constraints (4)–(6), which are required as an input to Ipopt.
Table 2 presents experimental results when solving NFGs (generated using
GAMUT [32]) through support enumeration using Z3 for filtering out unsatisfi-
able support assignments (with a timeout of 20ms) and Ipopt. For each NFG
the table lists the numbers of players, actions of each player and support assign-
ments. The table also includes the supports of each type returned by Z3 and
the solution time of Ipopt. As can be seen, by using Z3 we have significantly
reduced the assignments Ipopt needs to analyse, by orders of magnitude in some
cases. However, as the number of actions grows, the number of assignments that
remain for Ipopt to solve increases rapidly, and therefore also does the solution
time. Furthermore, increasing the number of players only magnifies this issue.
The solution times for NFGs may appear to be slow. We note that already find-
ing a NE is a difficult problem, while here we require SWNE, and hence find all
NE. For example, in [34], using a backtracking search algorithm or either of the
Simplicial Subdivision [39] and the Govindan-Wilson [18] algorithms for finding
a sample NE, there are instances of NFGs with 6 players and 5 actions that
timeout after 30 minutes.
We now present case studies and experimental results to demonstrate the
applicability of our approach and implementation.
Efficiency and Scalability. Table 3 presents a selection of results demonstrat-
ing the performance of the implementation. The models in the table are discussed
in more detail below. The results were carried out using a 2.10GHz Intel Xeon
Gold with 16GB of JVM memory. The table includes statistics for the models:
number of players, states, (maximum) actions for each player in a state and
Multi-player Equilibria Verification for Concurrent Stochastic Games 15
Case study & property
Players
Param. CSG statistics Constr. Verif.
[parameters] values States Max. Act. Trans. time(s) time (s)
Secret Sharing
R
max=?
[ F d∨r=rmax ]
model/[α,rmax ,pfail]
3
raa/0.3,10, 4,279 2,1,1 5,676 0.057 0.565
rba/0.3,10,0.2 7,095 2,1,1 9,900 0.090 0.939
rra/0.3,10, 8,525 2,2,1 11,330 0.250 25.79
rrr/0.3,10, 17,017 2,2,2 22,638 0.250 96.07
Public Good
R
max=?
[ I=kmax ]
[f, kmax]
3
2.9,2 758 3,3,3 1,486 0.098 7.782
2.9,3 16,337 3,3,3 36,019 0.799 110.1
2.9,4 279,182 3,3,3 703,918 6.295 1,459
4
2.9,1 83 3,3,3,3 163 0.046 0.370
2.9,2 6,644 3,3,3,3 13,204 0.496 7.111
2.9,3 399,980 3,3,3,3 931,420 11.66 99.86
5
2.9,1 245 3,3,3,3,3 487 0.081 2.427
2.9,2 59,294 3,3,3,3,3 118,342 2.572 2,291
Aloha (deadline)
Pmax=?[ F si∧t6D ]
[bmax, D]
3
1,8 3,519 2,2,2 5,839 0.168 11.23
2,8 14,230 2,2,2 28,895 0.430 14.05
3,8 72,566 2,2,2 181,438 1.466 18.41
4,8 413,035 2,2,2 1,389,128 7.505 43.23
4
1,8 23,251 2,2,2,2 42,931 0.708 75.59
2,8 159,892 2,2,2,2 388,133 3.439 131.7
3,8 1,472,612 2,2,2,2 4,777,924 28.69 819.2
5 1,8 176,777 2,2,2,2,2 355,209 3.683 466.3
Aloha
R
min=?
[ F si ]
[bmax]
3
1 1,034 2,2,2 1,777 0.096 40.76
2 5,111 2,2,2 10,100 0.210 29.36
3 22,812 2,2,2 56,693 0.635 51.22
4 107,799 2,2,2 355,734 2.197 150.1
Medium access
R
max=?
[ C6k ]
[emax, k]
3
5,10 1,546 2,2,2 17,100 0.324 147.9
10,10 10,591 2,2,2 135,915 1.688 682.7
15,20 33,886 2,2,2 457,680 4.663 6,448
4 5,5 15,936 2,2,2,2 333,314 4.932 3,581
Table 3: Statistics for a representative set of CSG verification instances.
transitions and the times to both build and verify the models. All models have
been verified in under 2 hours and in most cases much less than this. The largest
model, verified in under 15 minutes, has 4 players, almost 1.5 million states and
5 million transitions. The majority of the time is spent solving NFG games and,
as shown in Table 2, this varies depending on the number of choices and players.
Secret Sharing. The first case study is the secret sharing protocol of [20], which
uses uncertainty to induce cooperation. The protocol is defined for 3 agents and
can be extended to more agents by partitioning the agents into three groups.
Since the 3 agents act independently, this protocol could not be analysed with
the two-coalitional variant of rPATL [25]. Each agent has an unfair coin with
the same bias (α). In the first step of the protocol, each agent flips their coin,
and if their coins land heads, then they are supposed to send their share of
the secret to the other agents. In the second step, everyone reveals the value of
their coin to the other agents. The game ends if all agents obtain all shares and
therefore can all reconstruct the secret, or an agent cheats, i.e. fails to send their
share to another agent when they are supposed to. If neither of these conditions
hold, new shares are issued to the agents and a new round starts. The protocol
assumes that each agent prefers to learn the secret and that others do not learn.
This is expressed by the utilities u3, u2, u1 and u0 that an agent i gets if all the
agents, two agents (including i), only i and no agent is able to learn the secret,
respectively.
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Fig. 1: 〈〈usr1:usr2:usr3〉〉max=?(R[ F done ]+R[ F done ]+R[ F done ]) (pfail=0.2).
A rational agent in this context is one that has the choice of cheating and
ignoring the coin toss in order to maximise their utility. An altruistic agent is one
who strictly follows the protocol and a byzantine agent has a probability (pfail)
of failing and subsequently sending or computing the wrong values. Figure 1
presents the expected utilities when there are two altruistic and one rational
agent and when there is one altruistic, one byzantine and one rational agent
as α varies. The results when there is one altruistic and two rational agents or
three rational agents yield the same graph as Figure 1(a), where the one or two
additional rational agents utilities match those of the altruistic agents. According
to the theoretical results of [20], for a model with one rational and two altruistic
agents, the rational agent only has an incentive to cheat if:
u1·α
2
α2 + (1− α)2
+
u0·(1 − α)
2
α2 + (1− α)2
> u3 . (7)
This result is validated by Figure 1(a) for the given utility values; the rational
agent only cheats when α>0.5 (for α<0.5 all agents receive a utility of 1 corre-
sponding to all agents getting the secret), which corresponds to when (7) holds
for our chosen utility values. Furthermore, Figure 1 also shows that the closer
α is to one then the greater the expected utility of a rational agent. Figure 1(b)
also shows that, with a byzantine agent, the rational agent cheats when α>0.4.
Figure 2 plots the expected utilities of the agents when the protocol stops
after a maximum number of rounds (rmax ) when α=0.3 and α=0.8. The utilities
converge more slowly for α=0.3, since, when α is small, there is a higher chance
that an agent flips tails in a round, meaning not all agents will share their secret
in this round and the protocol will move into another round. Again we see that
there are more incentives for a rational agent to cheat as α gets closer to 1.
However, when α=0.3 and there are altruistic agents, the incentive decreases
and eventually disappears as the number of rounds increases.
Public Good Game. We consider a variant of public good game presented
in Example 2, in which the parameter f is fixed, each player receives an initial
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Fig. 2: Expected utilities over a bounded number of rounds (pfail=0.2 for rba).
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Fig. 3: 〈〈p1:p2:p3〉〉max=?(R
c1 [ I=rmax ]+Rc2[ I=rmax ]+Rc3 [ I=rmax ]) (einit=5, k=3).
amount of capital (einit ) and, in each of k months, can invest none, half or all
of their current capital. A 2-player version of the game was modelled in [26].
Figure 3 presents results for a 3-player public good game as f varies, plotting
the expected utilities when the players act in isolation and, for comparison, when
player 1 acts in isolation and players 2 and 3 form a coalition (indicated by 〈〈〉〉),
which would be required if the two-coalitional variant of rPATL [25] was used.
When the players act in isolation, for f62 there is no incentive for the players to
invest. As f increases, the players start to invest some of their capital in some of
the months, and when f=3 each player invests all their capital in each month.
On the other hand, when players 2 and 3 act in a coalition, there is incentive
to invest capital for smaller values of f , as players 2 and 3 can coordinate their
investments to ensure they both profit; however, player 1 also gains from these
investments, and therefore has no incentive to invest in the final month. As f
increases, there is a greater incentive for player 1 to invest and the final capital
for all the players increases. The drop in the capital of player 1, as f increases,
is caused by players 2 and 3 coordinating against player 1 and decreasing their
investments. This forces player 1 to invest to increase its investment which, as
profits are shared, also increases the capital of players 2 and 3.
18 Marta Kwiatkowska, Gethin Norman, David Parker, and Gabriel Santos
Aloha. This case study concerns a number of users trying to send packets using
the slotted ALOHA protocol introduced in [25]. In a time slot, if a single user
tries to send a packet, there is a probability q that the packet is sent; if k users
try and send, then the probability decreases to q/k. If sending a packet fails, the
number of slots a user waits before resending is set according to an exponential
backoff scheme. The analysis of the model in [25] consisted of considering three
users with two acting in coalition. We extend the analysis by considering the case
when the three act in isolation and extend the model with a fourth user. The
objectives concern maximising the probability of sending a packet within a dead-
line, e.g. 〈〈usr1: · · · :usrm〉〉max=?(P[ F (s1∧t6D) ]+· · ·+P[ F (sm∧t6D) ]), and the
expected time to send a packet. By allowing the users to act independently we
find that the expected time required for all users to send their packets reduces
compared to when two of the players act as a coalition.
Medium Access Control. This case study is based on a deterministic con-
current game model of medium access control [7]. The model consists of two
users that have limited energy and share a wireless channel. The users repeat-
edly choose to transmit or wait and, if both transmit, the transmissions fail due
to interference. We previously extended the model to three users and added the
probability of transmissions failing (which is dependent on the number of users
that try and send) [25]. However, the analysis was restricted to the scenario
where users 2 and 3 were in coalition [25]. We can now remove this restriction
and analyse the case when each user tries to maximise the expected number of
messages they sent over a bounded number of steps and extend this analyse to
four users.
6 Conclusions
We have extended previous work [25] presenting a logic, algorithm and imple-
mentation for model checking equilibria-based properties for CSGs that allow
for multi-coalitional verification. We have demonstrated the applicability of the
approach on a range of case studies and properties. The main limitation of the
approach is the time required for solving NFGs during value iteration as the
number of players increases. Efficiency improvements that could be employed
include filtering out conditionally dominated strategies [37], investigating cor-
related equilibria [5] and mechanism design [28]. In addition, existing solution
methods for NFGs can be sensitive to floating-point arithmetic issues, and there-
fore arbitrary precision representations may help to alleviate these problems.
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A Correctness of the Model Checking Algorithm for
Nonzero-Sum State Formulae
We fix a game G and nonzero-sum state formula 〈〈C1:· · ·:Cm〉〉opt∼x(θ) and let
C = {C1, . . . , Cm}. For the case of finite-horizon nonzero-sum formulae the cor-
rectness of the model checking algorithm follows from the fact that we use back-
ward induction [36,29]. Below we consider probabilistic and expected reachability
objectives in the case that opt=max. The remaining cases for infinite-horizon
nonzero-sum formulae follow similarly. For a nonzero-sum formula θ, we denote
by θi the ith term in θ. We first introduce the following objectives for the coali-
tion game GC which are n-step approximations of Xθi .
Definition 11. For any probabilistic or expected reachability nonzero-sum for-
mula θ, 16i6m and n ∈ N, let Xθi,n be the objective where for any path pi of
GC :
X
P[ F φ1 ]+···+P[ F φm ]
i,n (pi) =
{
1 if ∃k6n. pi(k) |=φi
0 otherwise
X
R
r1 [ F φ1 ]+···+Rrm [ F φm ]
i,n (pi) =


∞ if ∀k ∈ N. pi(k) 6|=φi∑ki
k=0r(pi, k) if k
i 6 n−1
0 otherwise
r(pi, k) = rA(pi(k), pi[k]) + rS(pi(k)) and k
i = min{k−1 | k ∈ N ∧ pi(k) |=φi}.
The following lemma demonstrates that, for a fixed strategy profile and state,
the values of these objectives are non-decreasing and converge uniformly to the
values of θ.
Lemma 2. For any probabilistic or expected reachability nonzero-sum formula
θ we have that the sequence 〈Eσ
GC ,s
(Xθi )〉n∈N is non-decreasing and, for any ε>0,
there exists N ∈ N such that for any n>N , s ∈ S, σ ∈ ΣGC and 16i6m :
0 6 Eσ
GC,s(X
θ
i )− E
σ
GC,s(X
θ
i,n) 6 ε .
Proof. Consider any probabilistic or expected reachability nonzero-sum formula
θ, state s and 16i6m. Using Assumption 1 we have that for subformulae Rr[ F φi ],
the set Sat(φi) is reached with probability 1 from all states of G under all profiles,
and therefore Eσ
GC,s
(Xθi ) is finite. Furthermore, for any n ∈ N , by Definitions 10
and 11 we have that Eσ
GC,s
(Xθi,n) is the value of state s for the nth iteration of
value iteration [11] when computing Eσ
GC ,s
(Xθi ) in the DTMC obtained from G
C
by following the strategy σ, which is guaranteed to converge. It therefore follows
that the sequence is both non-decreasing and converges uniformly. ⊓⊔
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In the proof of correctness we will use the fact that n iterations of value iteration
is equivalent to performing backward induction on the following game trees.
Definition 12. For any state s and n ∈ N, let GCn,s be the game tree correspond-
ing to playing GC for n steps when starting from state s and then terminating.
We can map any strategy profile σ of GC to a strategy profile of GCn,s by only
considering the choices of the profile over the first n steps when starting from
state s. This mapping is clearly surjective, i.e. we can generate all profiles of
GCn,s, but is not injective. We require the following lemma relating the values of
the objectives Xθi,n and X
θ
i over G
C and GCn,s for any n ∈ N and s ∈ S.
Lemma 3. For any probabilistic or expected reachability nonzero-sum formula
θ, state s of GC, strategy profile σ, n ∈ N and 16i6m : Eσ
GC ,s
(Xθi,n) = E
σ
GCn,s
(Xθi ).
Proof. The proof follows from Definitions 11 and 12, in particular, we have that
Xθi,n is the n-step approximations of X
θ
i and G
C
n,s corresponds to playing game
GC from state s for n steps. ⊓⊔
We now define the strategy profiles synthesised during value iteration.
Definition 13. For any n ∈ N and s ∈ S, let σn,s be the strategy profile gen-
erated for the game tree GCn,s (when considering value iteration as backward in-
duction) and σn,⋆ be the synthesised strategy profile for GC after n iterations.
Before giving the proof of correctness we require the following results.
Lemma 4. For any state s of GC , probabilistic or expected reachability nonzero-
sum formula θ and n ∈ N we have that σn,s is a subgame perfect SWNE of the
CSG GCn,s for the objectives (X
θ1 , . . . , Xθm).
Proof. The result follows from the fact that, for any n ∈ N and s ∈ S, the value
iteration procedure selects SWNEs, n steps of value iteration corresponds to
performing backward induction for the objectives (Xθ1 , . . . , Xθm) in the game
GCn,s and backward induction returns a subgame perfect NE [36,29]. ⊓⊔
The following proposition demonstrates that value iteration converges and de-
pends on Assumption 1. Without this assumption convergence cannot be guar-
anteed as demonstrated by the counterexamples in [24]. Although value iteration
converges, unlike value iteration for MDPs or zero-sum games the generated se-
quence of values is not necessarily non-decreasing.
Proposition 1. For any probabilistic or expected reachability nonzero-sum for-
mula θ and state s, the sequence 〈VGC(s, θ, n)〉n∈N converges.
Proof. For any state s and n ∈ N we can consider GCn,s as an m-player infinite-
action NFG Nn,s where for 16i6m:
– the set of actions of player i equals the set of strategies of player i in GC ;
– for the action pair (σ1, σ2), the utility function for player i returns E
σ
GCn,s
(Xθi ).
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The correctness of this construction relies on the mapping of strategy pro-
files from the game GC to GCn,s being surjective. Using Lemma 2, we have
that the sequence 〈Nn,s〉n∈N of NFGs converges uniformly, and therefore, since
VGC(s, θ, n) are subgame perfect SWNE values of G
C
n,s (see Lemma 4), the se-
quence 〈VGC (s, θ, n)〉n∈N also converges. ⊓⊔
A similar convergence result to Proposition 1 has been shown for discounted
properties of two-player games in [17].
Theorem 1. For a given probabilistic or expected reachability nonzero-sum for-
mula θ and ε>0, there exists N ∈ N such that for any n>N the strategy profile
σn,⋆ is a subgame perfect ε-SWNE for GC and the objectives (Xθ1 , . . . , Xθm).
Proof. Consider any ε>0. From Definition 13 for any s ∈ S, n>N and 16i6m:
E
σn,⋆
GC ,s(X
θ
i ) = E
σn,s
GCn,s
(Xθi ) . (8)
For any k ∈ N and s ∈ S, using Lemma 4 we have that σk,s is a NE of GCk,s, and
therefore for any k ∈ N, s ∈ S and 16i6m:
E
σk,s
GC
k,s
(Xθi ) = sup
σi∈Σ
GC
k,s
i
E
σ
k,s
−i
[σi]
GC
k,s
(Xθi ) . (9)
From Lemma 2 there exists N ∈ N such that for any n>N , s ∈ S and 16i6m:
supσi∈ΣGCi
E
σ
n,⋆
−i
[σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi )− supσi∈ΣGCi
E
σ
n,⋆
−i
[σi]
GC,s
(Xθi,n) 6 ε . (10)
Therefore, for any n>N , s ∈ S and 16i6m, using (8) we have:
E
σn,⋆
GC ,s(X
θ
i ) = E
σn,s
GCn,s
(Xθi )
= sup
σi∈Σ
GC
n,s
i
E
σ
n,s
−i
[σi]
GCn,s
(Xθi ) by (9)
= supσi∈ΣGCi
E
σ
n,⋆
−i
[σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi,n) by Lemma 3
6 supσi∈ΣGCi
E
σ
n,⋆
−i
[σi]
GC ,s
(Xθi )− ε by (10) since n>N
and hence, since ε>0, s ∈ S and 16i6m were arbitrary, σn,⋆ is a subgame perfect
ε-NE. It remains to show that the strategy profile is a subgame perfect social
welfare optimal ε-NE, which follows from the fact that when solving the bimatrix
games during value iteration social welfare optimal NE are returned. ⊓⊔
